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Trust and deception have been of concern to researchers since the earliest research into multi-agent trading systems (MATS).
In an open trading environment, trust can be established by external mechanisms e.g. using secret keys or digital signatures or
by internal mechanisms e.g. learning and reasoning from experience. However, in a MATS, where distrust exists among the
agents, and deception might be used between agents, how to recognise and remove fraud and deception in MATS becomes a
significant issue in order to maintain a trustworthy MATS environment. This paper will propose an architecture for a multi-
agent trading system (MATS) and explore how fraud and deception changes the trust required in a multi-agent trading
system/environment. This paper will also illustrate several forms of logical reasoning that involve trust and deception in a
MATS. The research is of significance in deception recognition and trust sustainability in e-business and e-commerce.
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INTRODUCTION
Trust and deception have been of concern to researchers since the earliest research into multi-agent trading systems (MATS).
Although much of the research in MATS assumes inherent benevolence, in practice a completely open agent society must
allow for the possibility of malevolent behaviour. In an open trading environment, trust can be established by external
mechanisms e.g. using secret keys or digital signatures or by internal mechanisms e.g. learning and reasoning from
experience.  As noted by Ramchurn et al (2004), many current computer applications are following a distributed model with
components available through a network e.g. the semantic web, web services and grid computing. The open multi-agent
system with autonomous agents has been suggested as the logical computational model for such applications (Jennings,
2001). As a result, the implications of trust and deception have broader relevance than just trading systems.
The logical foundations for conventional reasoning in a trusted environment are well known e.g modus ponens assumes that
given a fact (or truth) P and a rule QP → then we can safely assume that Q is true. However in a MATS, where distrust
exists among the agents, and deception might be used between agents, we can no longer assume that Q is  true  with  any
certainty. We need a different set of reasoning rules to simulate the deceptions or tricks in a multi-agent trading system. Most
research into trust and deception in agent societies focuses essentially on heuristic techniques e.g. by learning which agents to
trust (Wu et al (2002). However there seems to be little on the form of reasoning used by trustworthy and deceptive agents.
We will consider the underlying reasoning from a logical viewpoint.
This paper will discuss multi-agent trading systems, define a model for an MATS, explore how tricks and deceptions change
the reasoning required in a multi-agent trading system/environment and will illustrate several forms of logical reasoning that
involve trust and deception in a MATS. It looks at a systematic classification of reasoning techniques which can be applied
between buyers and sellers. The research is of significance in deception recognition and trust sustainability in e-business and
e-commerce. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines trading activities and proposes an architecture
 1020
Finnie et al. Trust and Deception in Multi-agent Trading Systems
Proceedings of the Eleventh Americas Conference on Information Systems, Omaha, NE, USA August 11th-14th 2005
for a multi-agent trading system (MATS). Section 3 discusses trust and deception in the MATS. Section 4 examines the
logical foundation for fraud and deception, and then looks at how agents commit fraud and deception in the MATS from a
logical viewpoint. Section 5 ends this paper with some concluding remarks.
MULTIAGENT TRADING SYSTEMS
This section will examine trading activities in business and commerce, propose an architecture for a multiagent trading
system (MATS),  and examine agent behaviors in the MATS.
Trading is the activity of buying and selling, or exchanging, goods and/or services between people or countries. Generally
speaking, there are six main different but fundamental trade types: barter, bargaining, bidding, auction, clearing, and
brokering (Liang and Huang, 2000, Sun and Finnie, 2004a). Because barter is a trade type in which both sides offer their
products for an exchange rather for money, we will not look at it further in the context of e-commerce. In modern business,
trading has become a relatively complex mechanism, because trading involve many networked or chained activities such as
searching, bidding, negotiating and making compromises with the seller (Sun and Finnie, 2004b). More specifically, the
modern trading system consists of activities at three different levels: the market level, contract level, and activity level (Liang
and Huang, 2000). At the market level, the agent helps determine the proper trade types. At the contract level, a particular
trade type has been chosen. The corresponding agent helps with performing and monitoring the transaction process. At the
activity level each agent is capable of performing certain tasks such as information search or alternative evaluation.  At the
same time, the agents in the trading systems require also some supporting tools such as an order management system,
payment management system, decision support system, etc.
Multi-agent systems (MAS) for electronic commerce probably had their origins in the pioneering work of the Autonomous
Agents group of the MIT Media Lab led by Pattie Maes which resulted in the Kasbah trading agent and Market Maker
(Chavez and Maes, 1996). Other simple on-line shopping agents followed e.g. shopping bots like “Ask Jeeves”. More and
more  MATSs  are  being  developed  in  order  to  realize  the  transformation  from  conventional  trading  to  e-trading  taking
advantage of the internet and e-commerce technology. In  what  follows,  we propose  an  architecture  for  a  MATS based on
MAS techniques, as shown in Fig. 1.
In this architecture, the market coordinator helps the buyer or seller or their agents to enter the multi-agent trading market,
where the bidder, auctioneer, broker, bargain agents, and clearing agents are the main players. Each of them is responsible for
a corresponding trading type, for example, a bidder is responsible for bidding on behalf of the buyer agent to sell a
commodity, while the auctioneer is responsible for auction of a commodity on behalf of the seller agent. The search agent,
order agent, decision assistant, transaction agent and payment agent are common agent resources for the multi-agent trading
market. They serve every trader, buyer and seller in the market.  The trading activity here follows a trading cycle
(Wittkowski and Pitt, 2000;Liang and Huang, 2000): First, the bid step, in which the buyer agent receives demands and asks
the bidder to issue bids to seller agents to meet that demand. This step is the most difficult for any trading. The search agent
and decision assistant play an important role in this step. Secondly, the offer step, in which the buyer agent asks the bargain
agent, or auctioneer, or broker to make offers of the units in response to the bids they have received. Third, the transaction
step, as soon as the buyer agent accepts the offer, the offer will be processed with the help of the order agent, transaction
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agent, and payment agent.  Fourth, the utilization step, in which the buyer agent distributes the units offered to his/her buyer,
and notifies the seller or seller agent that offered them units whether they utilized all the allocation they were offered. In any
practical environment, several of these agent activities may be merged into a single agent.
TRUST AND DECEPTION IN MATS
As in any other form of society, agents can exhibit malevolent behavior in the multiagent trading environment.  With the
focus moving to the distributed systems paradigm and the multi-agent programming model,  the study of trust and deception
in agent interaction has significant implications for the operation of these systems.
Ramchurn, Huynh and Jennings(2004) provide an extensive review of research into trust in multi-agent systems. They define
trust as follows: “Trust is a belief an agent has that the other party will do what it says it will (being honest and reliable) or
reciprocate (being reciprocative for the common good of both), given an opportunity to defect to get higher payoffs”. The
authors conceptualise trust as (a) individual-level trust (agent believes in honesty or reciprocation of interaction partners)  and
(b) system-level trust (the agents are forced to be trustworthy by the system). They further characterise individual level trust
models as learning (evolution) based, reputation-based or socio-cognitive based. Learning models are based on interactions
with other agents. Reputation based models work by asking other agents of their opinion of potential partners, often based on
some form of social network (Sabater and Sierra, 2002 ) Rather than relying on interaction with other agents, socio-cognitive
models operate on subjective perceptions of opponents. Wong and Sycara (1999) address two forms of trust i.e. trust that
agents will not misbehave and trust that agents are really delegates of whom they claim to be. Vassileva et al (2002) consider
the formation of long term coalitions of customer and vendor agents using an agent trust model.  Others have done research
on agent learning in an untrustworthy environment i.e.  agents who will attempt to cheat or trick each other in trading. For
example, Wu et al (2002) show that trust can be established if agents learn which other agents exhibit poor behavior and
hence which agents not to trust.
The research in this paper relates to individual level trust as defined by Ramchurn et al (2004). However all the models above
rely on establishing a numerical metric of trust which can be used to rank or select partners. The current research is more
interested in establishing a logical framework for viewing trust and deception rather than establishing an actual measure of
the degree of trust.
Trust and deception are twins in MATS  Trust in MATS can be sustained only if we can understand how agents commit fraud
and deception in a MATS, Furthermore, how will agents in a MATS operate autonomously in such an environment and what
precautions will they need to take to protect their “owners” from fraudulent or malevolent acts? In human trading systems,
“caveat emptor” or “let the buyer beware” is a well known trading rule of thumb. Humans expect the possibility of fraud and
deception in trades and accordingly take whatever precautions are possible. Less well know is the Latin maxim “caveat
mercator” or “let the merchant beware”.  The latter is particularly relevant with the increase in internet fraud with on-line
merchants carrying the cost of fraudulent transactions. If this is the norm in conventional trading systems, why should it be
any different in multi-agent systems?
In what follows, we will use the following general definitions, which are taken from the Cambridge International Dictionary
of English:
“Fraud is a person or thing that is not what is claimed, or a crime of obtaining money by deceiving people.”
“Deception is an act of hiding the truth, especially, to get an advantage.”
In business and social activities, fraud depends on deception, while deception is realized through fraud. Further, the aim of
both fraud and deception is to get advantage in an environment with conflict of interests. Therefore, in what follows, we only
refer to deception rather than fraud and deception, if necessary.
With the development of the Internet, we find ourselves in hybrid artificial societies, where real world assumptions and the
whole range of possible behaviors including deception must be taken into account (Ramchurn et al, 2004; Wooldridge and
Jennings, 1994). From an e-commerce viewpoint, there are three different kinds of deception in hybrid artificial society:
fraud and deception between humans (via computers), deception between humans and intelligent agents and deception
between agents in multi-agent societies such as multi-agent e-commerce. In what follows, we focus on deception in MATS.
From the architecture proposed in Section 2, we can see that there are many agents operating in the multi-agent trading
market. Some agents are trustworthy, for example, the market coordinator, search agent, order agent, transaction agent, and
payment agent. All these agents are working as a lubricant for a healthy multi-agent trading market. These agents work for
buyer agents, seller agents and others such as brokers and bidders in a neutral way in order to maintain the market trading
order.  However, the buyer agents, seller agents, bidders, auctioneers, brokers and bargain agents may not be trustworthy.
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These  agents  may deceive  other  agents  in  the  MATS in  order  to  obtain  the  maximum advantage  or  profit,  just  as  buyers,
sellers and brokers may use deception in a traditional trading market. In fact, the internet and information technology (IT)
techniques provide new opportunities and ways to deceive, because intelligent agents in MATS will also participate in fraud
and deception, and agents are and will be designed, selected or trained to deceive in MATS, and people will be also be
deceived by intelligent agents (Sun and Finnie, 2004a). Deception in the MATS can take a variety of forms e.g. pretending to
be someone else, offering goods for sale which they don’t have, buying goods but not paying, etc. This is one of the reasons
why many people fear to trade in the MATS or in online trading. However, we usually would not stop driving because we
saw a fatal car accident on the highway. Similarly, we cannot stop developing online trading and MATS, although we find
some fraud and deception cases in online trading and e-commerce. The most important issue for us is recognizing and
preventing fraud and deception in MATS. To this end, it is necessary to answer:  What is the logical foundation of fraud and
deception, because the essence of fraud and deception depends on its logical foundation.
A LOGICAL VIEWPOINT FOR FRAUD AND DECEPTION IN MATS
This section will examine the logical foundation for fraud and deception, and then look at how the  agents commit fraud and
deception in the MATS from a logical viewpoint.
Inference rules play a pivotal role in any reasoning paradigm, because any reasoning is based on an inference rule or a couple
of inference rules (Sun and Finnie, 2004a). For example, modus ponens and modus tollens are central to deductive reasoning.
Sun and Finnie have proposed eight basic inference rules for performing experience based reasoning (EBR) (Sun and Finnie,
2005), which are summarized in Table 1, and cover all possible EBRs, and constitute the fundamentals for all natural
reasoning paradigms at the first level. The eight inference rules are listed in the first row, and their corresponding general
forms are shown in the second row respectively.
Table 1. Experience based reasoning: Eight inference rules













































Four of them, modus ponens (MP), modus tollens (MT), abduction and modus ponens with trick (MTT) are well-known in
AI and computer science but the other four need some clarification.  First of all, we illustrate modus tollens with trick with an
example. We may know that:
1. If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal
2. Socrates is immortal.
What we wish is to prove “Socrates is human”. In order to do so, let
• QP → : If Socrates is human, then Socrates is mortal
•  P: Socrates is human
•  Q: Socrates is mortal.
Therefore, we have P: Socrates is human, based on modus tollens with trick, and the knowledge in the knowledge base (KB)
(note that Q¬ : Socrates is not mortal). From this example, we can see that modus tollens with trick is a kind of EBR1.
Abduction with trick2 can  be  considered  as  a  “dual”  form  of  abduction,  which  is  also  the  summary  of  a  kind  of  EBR.
Abduction can be used to explain that the symptoms of the patients result from specific diseases, while abduction with trick
1 Because of space limits, we do not introduce any examples in this paper from now on.
2       If the reader does not like to use trick or deception, he can use “exception” instead. The essence is that such kinds of inferences have not yet examined
in computer science and artificial intelligence, although they are necessary for EBR.
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can be used to exclude some possibilities of the diseases of the patient. Therefore, abduction with trick is an important
complementary part for performing system diagnosis and medical diagnosis based on abduction.
Inverse modus ponens (IMP) is also a rule of inference in EBR. The “inverse” in the definition is motivated by the fact that
the “inverse” is defined in mathematical logic: “if p¬ then q¬ ”, provided that if p then q is given (Sun and Finnie 2004b).
Based on this definition, the inverse of QP → is QP ¬→¬ ,  and  then  from P¬ , QP ¬→¬ , we have Q¬ using
modus ponens. Because QP → and QP ¬→¬ are not logically equivalent, the argument based on Inverse modus ponens
is not valid in mathematical logic. However, the EBR based on inverse modus ponens is a kind of common sense reasoning,
because there are many cases that follow inverse modus ponens. For example, if John has enough money, then John will fly
to China. Now John does not have sufficient money, then we can conclude that John will not fly to China.
The last inference rule for EBR is inverse modus ponens with trick (IMPT). The difference between IMPT and inverse modus
ponens is again “with trick”, this is because the reasoning performer tries to use the trick of “make a feint to the east and
attack in the west”; that is, he gets Q rather than Q¬ in the inverse modus ponens.
These eight different inference rules provide a logical foundation for any natural reasoning paradigms at the fundamental (or
atomic) level, so that they can be applied to both benevolent and deceptive agent societies. In what follows, we give several
examples to illustrate this view.
We assume that in the MATS, the seller agent, S,  will  offer goods at a specific price while the buyer agent B will agree to
purchase a specific volume at a specific price. If the MATS provides a trustworthy trading environment, we can assume that
conventional reasoning applies i.e. Modus ponens, modus tollens and possible abduction are used in the agents in MATS to
conduct any trading activities. For the buyer agent B, his trustworthy reasoning could be as follows:
If a seller offers goods at a price then those goods will be available at that price. We assume that G and D are propositions:
G: = goods offered at known price, D: = goods are available for delivery.
Modus ponens is what the buyer agent or seller agent normally uses in the trading activities: bidding, brokering, negotiation
and making compromises, because they believe that If G, DG →  Then D. They also use modus tollens in the trading
activities, i.e. if goods are not available then they will not be offered for sale by an agent.
If not D i.e. goods are not available, Then Not G i.e goods will not be offered for sale.
Abduction is another common sense inference rule underpinning the marketplace i.e. if a seller agent, S, has goods available
for delivery, D, he/she will make them available for sale. That is,
D (Goods are available and will be delivered)
DG →
Therefore, we have G (goods will be offered at a known price).
However, the environment provided by the MATS is not always trustworthy, because some agents (e.g. buyer agents, seller
agents, bidders, auctioneers, brokers, and bargainers) may have a conflict of interests so that they will try to deceive their
trading partners.  In what follows, we look at several scenarios in the simple buyer/seller context where deception or fraud
could apply and consider the variations on traditional logic which could provide a logical base for the reasoning. More detail
on these inference rules and their coverage of all forms of experience based reasoning is available in Sun and Finnie (2004c).
A number of scenarios will be proposed where the buyer agent is misled in their dealings with the seller agent in the MATS.
(1) A seller agent may offer goods at a price, G, but those goods are not available, which case is a obvious fraud. An example
could be malevolent or fraud behaviour by a competitor of the buyer company e.g. to delay production by ensuring that
materials in the supply chain are not delivered. This could also apply to competitors of the supplier e.g. to reduce the chances
that a competitor does not achieve the deal by offering goods at a lower price. This scenario could be described as modus
ponens with trick  (MPT) (see Table 1 above). It takes the form
G (goods at known price),
DG →
Therefore, Not D (goods are not available for delivery)
The essence behind this fraudulent behavior is that the seller agent has used the inference rule with trick, which deceives the
buyer agent.
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(2) A second form of deception could arise in the MATS, if a seller agent does not offer goods at a price but the goods are in
fact available at that price. This could arise if there are limited goods available and a seller wishes to preference another
buyer (agent). This is referred to as inverse modus ponens with trick (IMPT) and takes the form:
Not G (not offer goods at a price)
DG →
Therefore, D (goods are in fact available at that price)
(3) We could also have the situation where goods are not available but are offered at a specific price. This varies slightly
from case (1) above in that the starting point is that the goods are not available. This could for example be a negotiating tactic
if goods will be available within a short time.  This is called modus tollens with trick (MTT) and takes the form:
Not D (goods are not available),
DG →
Therefore, G (goods are offered at a specific price)
 (4) We could have the situation where goods are available for delivery but not at that price. This could be used to fool the
buyer into intending to make a purchase – again as a possible negotiating tactic or delaying tactic. This could be termed
abduction with trick (AT) and takes the form:
D (goods are available for delivery)
DG →
Not G (goods are not offered at that price)
There are also a number of scenarios of fooling the seller or seller agent in the MATS. As above, the seller assumes that: If
goods are purchased at a specific price, the seller will receive the amount in full. The most usual form of fraud and deception
would be where goods are purchased but the seller does not receive the full amount (or anything). This is theft or fraud and
can be represented as modus ponens with trick (MPT).  Other  forms  of  inference  rules  do  not  apply  easily  to  deceive  the
seller. Inverse modus ponens with trick (IMPT) or abduction with trick (AT) suggest that goods are not purchased at a
specific price but that the seller receives the full amount, which might be good for the seller but not that likely in practice.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we examined trading activities in business and commerce, and proposed an architecture for a multiagent trading
system (MATS). Then we examined agent behavior in the MATS, in particular trustworthy behaviors, and fraud and
deception behaviors of agents in the MATS from a logical viewpoint.
Fraud and deception are an unavoidable phenomenon for engineering MATS. Failure to research and understand deception
will lose the “biological” balance in MATS. Benevolent agent societies assume a fundamental basis of the conventional
forms of reasoning i.e. modus ponens, modus tollens and abduction. In situations with malevolent or fraudulent agents it is
useful to consider other forms of reasoning to better model the processes involved. Although heuristic techniques have been
applied to learn which agents could be deceptive, this paper looks at the underlying models of reasoning which might apply
with such agents.
It should be noted that what we have examined here is inference-based fraud and deception in MATS. In fact, fraud and
deception can be classified into different categories from a knowledge-based viewpoint (Sun and Finnie, 2004a): Knowledge-
based fraud and deception, Inference-based fraud and deception, and hybrid fraud deception. For example, if agent B and
agent S possess different knowledge but have the same reasoning methods, then one of them can deceive the other. This is a
typical knowledge-based deception. If agent B and agent S possess the same knowledge but have different reasoning
methods, then again one of them can deceive the other. This is a typical inference-based deception. If they have different
background knowledge and used different inference rules for reasoning, then we may have hybrid deception. Different
categories of fraud and deception require different strategies and methods for detection, recognition and prevention of fraud
and deception, in order to sustain a trustworthy MATS environment, which we will examine in future work.
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